

ESTIMATED LOSSES
JUNE 5-10, 1967

	Prisoners and Missing			Wounded	Combat Aircraft	
	Killed	Missing	Tanks		Destroyed	Survived
Israel	800 ^a	18	100	2,440	40 ^b	
Egypt	11,500 ^c	5,500	700	15,000	264	
Syria	700	500	105	3,500	58	
Jordan	2,000	4,500 ^d	125	5,000	22	
Iraq	100	—	20	300	24	

a. Israel reported 679 dead and 2,563 wounded on June 11; it is assumed that about half of 225 seriously wounded later died.

b. Only 2 in air-to-air combat; an air combat loss ratio of exactly 1-25.

c. More than half were lost in the desert.

d. Many probably were deserters with "West Bank" origins; Israel captured approximately 500 Jordanian prisoners of war.

1967, June 3-4. Israeli Deception. Four landing craft, on huge trucks, were ostentatiously sent by road from the Mediterranean to Eilat, then sent back at night to repeat the ostentatious daylight movement. Egyptian intelligence assumed that at least 8 (and probably more, due to multiple reports) of Israel's 18 LCTs were available for operations in the Gulf of Aqaba. During the night of June 4/5 several Egyptian vessels were sent from the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, to counter the anticipated Israeli threat. In this way Israel substantially reduced the imbalance of forces in the Mediterranean.

1967, June 5. Engagement off Port Said. An Israeli destroyer and several MTBs approached Port Said after dark. They were met outside the breakwater by two Egyptian *Osa*-class missile boats. After an inconclusive exchange of fire, with little damage to either side, the Egyptian vessels withdrew into the harbor. Israeli frogmen also entered the harbors of Port Said and Alexandria; some damage was done to Egyptian vessels in Alexandria, but all of the frogmen there were captured.

Economic Warfare

On June 5, at an Arab League meeting in Baghdad, representatives of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Algeria, Abu Dhabi, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon agreed to stop the flow of oil to all nations they believed had attacked any Arab states. This included the United States, whom the Egyptians also accused of participating in the first air attack, Great Britain, and West Germany, as well as Israel. Only Kuwait, Iraq, and Algeria seem to have taken serious measures to carry

1967, June 6. Egyptian Withdrawal from Port Said. The intensity of Israeli air attacks, and the threat of General Tal's advance along the northern Sinai coast, caused the Egyptian Navy to withdraw to Alexandria all of its vessels based on Port Said.

1967, June 6-7. Egyptian Coastal Bombardment. Three Egyptian submarines briefly shelled the Israeli coast, near Ashdod, and north and south of Haifa. They submerged and withdrew when attacked by Israeli air and naval forces.

1967, June 7. Israeli Seizure of Sharm el-Sheikh. A task force of 3 MTBs seized the Egyptian fortifications at Sharm el-Sheikh. After Israeli paratroops arrived, the naval vessels proceeded through the Strait of Tiran to the Red Sea without interference.

1967, June 8. The Liberty Incident. During the afternoon the U.S.S. *Liberty*, electronics surveillance vessel, 14 nautical miles north of El Arish, was attacked and seriously damaged by Israeli fighter-bombers and MTBs. The Israeli government's subsequent apology was accepted by the United States.

THE "OCTOBER WAR"

(YOM KIPPUR WAR OR THE WAR OF RAMADAN)

OCTOBER 6-24, 1973

Background

President Anwar Sadat of Egypt apparently decided in November 1972 to war on the basis of readiness estimates supplied to him by the Egyptian Minister of War, General (later Field Marshal) Ahmed Ismail Ali. Both knew that I had not reached tactical-technical military parity with Israel and that there would be another Israeli victory. Sadat, however, believed that Israel was satisfied with the *status quo*, and its *de facto* annexation of the territories conquered in and thus would make no moves toward reasonable negotiations without pressure from one or both of the great powers. The only possibility of moving toward Middle East settlement seemed to be to precipitate action that would force major powers and the U.N. to pay attention to the "no peace no war" situation in the Middle East.

1973, September 12. Arabs Select D-Day. Sadat, General Ismail, and President Hafiz Assad of Syria met secretly during an Arab summit meeting in Cairo. Extraordinary and successful measures were taken to preserve secrecy of plans.

1973, September 26. Arab Concentrations; Israeli Alert. Egypt and Syria announced concentrations of troops for routine maneuvers. Although Israeli and U.S. intelligence believed there would be no war, a partial but perfunctory Israeli alert was ordered, including deployment of a second armored brigade to the Golan area (September 29).

1973, October 4-5. Partial Evacuation of Soviet Advisors. The hasty departure of some Soviet advisors and all dependents was noted by Israeli and American intelligence agencies, which again informed their governments that there would be no war (October 5).

1973, October 6, 0400 Hours. War Inevitable. Israeli Director of Intelligence, General Elhau Zeira, informed Lieutenant General David Elazar that the Arabs would attack at 1800 hours. Israeli mobilization was ordered at 0930.

SINAI FRONT

1973, October 6, 1405 Hours. Outbreak of War. A massive Egyptian air strike against Israeli artillery and command

artillery bombardment of Bar Lev fortifications along the Canal achieved complete tactical surprise; Israeli frontline units had been only partially alerted. **1973, October 6-7. Egyptian Assault on Suez Canal.** Egyptian command crossed the Canal at 1435, followed by infantry, engineers, and a few amphibious and ferried tanks. Engineers, opening approaches in the Bar Lev Line's sandbank by demolitions and water had bridges operational in the Second Army area before midnight October 7. The Third Army area the bridge construction was not completed until the night of October 7/8. About 500 Egyptian tanks crossed the Canal. Two quickly mobilized reserve Israeli armored divisions under Generals Ariel (Arik) Sharon and Abham (Bren) Adan approached the front near Romani, Sharon near Taba. **1973, October 8. Israeli Counterattacks.** Counterattacks against the Egyptian Second Army, by Adan's division and Sharon's division (only parts were engaged), were repulsed with heavy losses. The Israelis dug in and the Egyptians consolidated, linking up all their bridgheads. Israeli close support aircraft suffered heavy losses from Egyptian aircraft defense using Soviet missiles at guns.

1973, October 11. Egyptians Plan Offensive

	Killed	Wounded	Captured	Aircraft
el	189	899	4	15
pt (in combat with Israel)	(30 officers) 1,000 ^a	4,000 ^a	6,000	8
pt (in combat with Anglo-French)	650 ^c	900	185	207 ^d
rain	16	96	0	4 ^e
nce	10	33	0	1

a. The most widely accepted figure.

b. Estimate.

c. The official estimate. Others run as high as 3,000.

d. Of these, 200 destroyed on the ground.

e. One of these was shot down over Syria by Syrian AA fire.

THE SIX-DAY WAR JUNE 5-10, 1967

Background

President Nasser of Egypt, who had concluded an alliance with Syria (1966, member), accused Israel of threatening aggression against Syria and promised to come to Syria's aid (May 16). He moved several divisions close to the Israeli-Syrian border, in the eastern Sinai. On May 18 he demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which had been patrolling the 48-1966 cease-fire line. U.N. Secretary General U Thant ordered an immediate NEF withdrawal. On May 22, Nasser, having placed a garrison at Sharm el-Sheikh, announced the blockade of the Strait of Tiran, effectively closing the Israeli port of Eilat. While the United States, within and without the U.N., endeavored to find a formula for peace, both sides seemed bent on war. On May 30 Egypt and Jordan signed a Mutual Security Treaty, and Egypt at once sent General Abdul Moneim Riadh to take command of allied Arab forces on the Jordan front.

Chronology of prewar events follows:

May 16 Egypt declared a state of emergency.
 May 17 Egypt and Syria announced "combat readiness" and Jordan announced mobilization.
 May 18 Syria and Egypt placed troops on maximum alert; Iraq and Kuwait announced mobilization.
 May 19 UNEF withdrawal.
 May 20 Israel completed partial mobilization.
 May 23 Saudi Arabian forces prepared to participate.
 May 24 Jordanian mobilization completed.
 May 28 Sudan mobilized.
 May 29 Algerian units moved to Egypt.
 May 30 Egypt and Jordan sign mutual security treaty.
 May 31 Iraqi troops began moving to Jordan.

Israel had earlier announced that it would go to war under any of the following conditions: closing of the Strait of Tiran; sending of Iraqi troops to Jordan; signing of an Egyptian-Jordanian defense pact; withdrawal of UNEF forces. All of these conditions now existed. War thus was inevitable, although Nasser surprisingly did not think his actions would provoke an Israeli attack.

The Opposing Forces

The following table shows the numerical strengths of the principal participating forces. In most respects the Israeli Army was better trained and much more flexible than any of its opponents, with the possible exception of Jordan. Israeli first-line aircraft were more heavily armed, and the quality and training of Israeli pilots and support units were so much superior to those of the Arab pilots (who were in short supply) that the Israeli Air Force, under Major General Mordechai Hod, was at least two or three times more effective than the combined air forces of its Arab opponents.

ESTIMATED MOBILIZATION STRENGTHS

June 5, 1967

	Mobilized Manpower	Division or Equivalent	Tanks	Artillery Pieces	Combat Aircraft	Naval Vessels ^a
Israel	230,000	8	1,100	200	260	22
Egypt	200,000	10	1,200	600	431	60
Syria	65,000	4	750	315	90	15
Jordan	56,000	3½	287	72	18	—
Iraq	90,000	5	200	500	110	15 ^b

a. Including MTBs.

b. Not available for use against Israel.

OPERATIONS, SINAI FRONT

1967, June 5. Israeli Preemptive Air Strike. With the approval of Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and recently appointed Minister of Defense General Moshe Dayan, the Israeli General Staff, under Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Itzhak Rabin, decided that since war was inevitable, Israel should obtain the advantage of surprise by launching preemptive attack by air and ground. Early in the morning the Israeli Air Force, flying west over the Mediterranean, then south into Egypt, struck practically every Egyptian airfield and virtually wiped out the Egyptian Air Force. Later in the day, the IAF also destroyed the air forces of Jordan and Syria and—in retaliation for an Iraqi air strike against Israel—inflicted considerable damage on Iraqi air units based in the Mosul area.

1967, June 5. First Day. From north to south the Israeli forces comprised a reinforced mechanized brigade under Colonel Yehuda Resheff, a mechanized division commanded by Major General Israel Tal, an armored division under Major General Abraham Yoffe, a mechanized division

under Major General Ariel Sharon; other smaller units were deployed along the frontier down to Eilat. Tal's division initiated the offensive by a drive into the Khan Yunis-Rafah-El Arish area. Resheff's brigade and attached elements drove into the Gaza Strip, and Sharon's division struck southward against the critical fortifications in the Abu Agaila-Kusseima area. Later in the day Yoffe struck southward between the divisions of Tal and Sharon, to penetrate into the heart of the Sinai, to cut off the Egyptian retreat.

1967, June 4-6. Accusations of US Participation. In a radio conversation monitored by the Israelis, King Hussein agreed with President Nasser to accuse the United States of collaborating with Israel, but quickly stopped the accusations after release of the taped radio conversation by Israel. Most Arab nations, except for Jordan, followed Nasser's lead and broke diplomatic relations with the U.S.

1967, June 6. Second Day. Gaza surrendered to Resheff in the afternoon. Tal, having secured Rafah and El Arish, sent a task